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City of Henderson v. Spangler, 136 Nev. Adv. Op. 25 (May 14, 2020)1 
 
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION: COMPENSABILITY OF PREEXISTING CONDITIONS 
AGGRAVATED BY OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES 
 
Summary 
 
City of Henderson Police Officer Jared Spangler sought workers’ compensation benefits, 
alleging that workplace conditions aggravated his significant loss of hearing. Multiple medical 
experts opined that Spangler’s hearing loss likely preexisted his employment, but that the 
workplace conditions increased his symptoms. However, the City’s compensation administrator 
denied Spangler’s claim because Spangler failed to show that his symptoms arose out of his 
employment. The appeals officer affirmed the decision, but the district court reversed.  
On review, the Nevada Court of Appeals first determined that Spangler alleged an 
“occupational disease” and not an “accidental injury.” Second, they clarified two historical uses 
of the word “preexisting”—one meaning preexisting the claim, the other meaning preexisting the 
employment. Third, they discovered that Spangler’s claim was governed by NRS 617.366(1), 
which provides that a preexisting condition could be compensable if an occupational disease 
aggravates the condition. Finally, they determined that the appeals officer’s decision to deny the 
claim was based on (1) an erroneous interpretation of the relevant statutes, and (2) a failure to 
apply NRS 617.366(1). Spangler needed only to show that his preexisting condition was 
aggravated by an occupational disease. Thus, the court affirmed the district court’s reversal and 
remanded for further proceedings.  
 
Background 
 
 This case arises out of City of Henderson Police Officer Jared Spangler’s second claim for 
workers’ compensation benefits, made in 2016. Spangler’s first claim was in 2005 and alleged that 
the work-related noises—gun shots, sirens, radio chatter—caused him significant loss of hearing. 
The claim was denied, because the medical expert determined Spangler’s symptoms preexisted his 
employment. Spangler did not appeal.  
Then, in 2016, Spangler filed a second claim, again alleging that the exposure to the same 
work-related noises caused his condition to worsen. During this time, Spangler consulted three 
medical experts to determine the cause of his hearing loss. The first expert opined that, while the 
condition may have preexisted Spangler’s employment, the work-related sounds caused an 
increase in Spangler’s hearing loss. The second expert equivocally opined that job noise exposure 
might have worsened the hearing loss. Before Spangler consulted the third expert, the City’s 
workers compensation administrator denied Spangler’s claim. In preparation for appeal, Spangler 
sought a third medical expert, who opined that Spangler’s condition preexisted his employment, 
but that the work environment was a contributory factor in the worsening of his condition. 
Ultimately, the appeals officer affirmed the denial of the claim, reasoning that Spangler failed to 
show an “injury by accident” or “occupational disease.”  
 Spangler petitioned for judicial review, whereby the district court granted the petition and 
reversed the appeals officer’s decision. The City then appealed the district court’s orders, which 
brought the matter before the Nevada Supreme Court.  
 
1  By Connor J. Bodin. 
Discussion 
 
The City argued that the appeals officer (1) correctly interpreted “accident” as defined by 
NRS 616A.030; (2) correctly found that Spangler did not establish an “injury by accident” under 
NRS 616C.175(1); and (3) correctly found that Spangler’s condition was not a compensable 
“occupational disease” under NRS 617.440.2  
 
Standard of Review 
 
 When reviewing an administrative agency’s decision, after a petition for judicial review, 
the court of appeals grants no deference to the district court’s decision.3 If the administrative 
agency’s fact-based conclusions of law are sound and supported by substantial evidence, the court 
will not reverse them.4 Evidence is substantial if a reasonable mind could find it adequate to 
support a conclusion.5 However, the court of appeals reviews administrative agency’s conclusions 
of law de novo.6 
 There are two types of work-induced conditions that compensable: (1) an “injury” under 
NRS Chapters 616A-D; or (2) an “occupational disease” under NRS Chapter 617.7 
 
Whether Spangler’s hearing loss constitutes a compensable “injury by accident” under NRS 
Chapters 616A-D 
 
 The court quotes NRS 616A.030, which defines an “accident” as “an unexpected or 
unforeseen event happening suddenly and violently, with or without human fault, and producing 
at the time objective symptoms of an injury.”8 Spangler did not allege that his symptoms arose 
from a single, unforeseen event, but that they gradually worsened from his continuous exposure to 
the work-related noises. To this point, the court relied on the medical experts’ reports, none of 
which opined that a single incident caused Spangler’s condition. Thus, the court concluded that 
substantial evidence supported the appeals officer’s decision that Spangler’s claim did not 
establish an “injury by accident.” 
 
Whether Spangler’s hearing loss constitutes a compensable “occupational disease” under NRS 
Chapter 617 
 
The court then turns to the more contentious question of whether Spangler’s condition was 
an “occupational disease.” To be a compensable “occupational disease,” the court emphasizes that 
(1) the employee must show that occupational environment was most likely the cause of the 
disease, and (2) the employee must show a disablement resulting from the disease and not just the 
mere contraction.9  
 
2  NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 616A.030, 616C.175(1), 617.440 (2017). 
3  Elizondo v. Hood Mach., 129 Nev. 780, 784, 312 P.3d 479, 482 (2013).  
4  Grover C. Dils Med. Ctr. v. Menditto, 121 Nev. 278, 283, 112 P.3d 1093, 1097 (2005).  
5  Horne v. State Indus. Ins. Sys., 113 Nev. 532, 537, 936 P.2d 839, 842 (1997).  
6  Star Ins. Co. v. Neighbors, 122 Nev. 773, 776, 138 P.3d 507, 509-10 (2006) 
7  NEV. REV. STAT. chs. 616A-D, 617 (2017).  
8  NEV. REV. STAT. § 616A.030 (2017). 
9  Seaman v. McKesson Corp., 109 Nev. 8,10, 846 P.2d 280, 282 (1993); Employers Ins. Co. of Nev. v. Daniels, 122 
Nev. 1009, 1014, 145 P.3d 1024, 1027 (2006). 
Before continuing with their analysis, the court reiterates Spangler’s allegation. Spangler 
alleged that although his hearing loss preexisted his employment, his employment made his 
hearing loss significantly worse to the point where he could no longer perform his duties. As such, 
he alleged NRS 617.440 covers his condition, despite it being preexisting. 
 
The meaning of “preexisting” 
 
First, the court clarified the Nevada Supreme Court’s use of the term “preexisting.” In the 
past, the Court used the term in two different ways. In one way, “preexisting” refers to physical 
symptoms and physical states that preexisted the claim for benefits, even though they may not have 
preexisted the employment.10 In another way, Spangler’s way, “preexisting” refers to physical 
symptoms and physical states that preexisted the employment entirely. To elucidate the difference, 
the court references numerous cases where they use “preexisting” in the former manner and 
contrast them with NRS 617.366, which uses “preexisting” in the latter manner.11 The court notes 
that neither party cited to NRS 617.366, although the statute governs the issue at hand, as it 
provides that a condition shall be deemed to be an occupational disease, and almost certainly 
compensable, if an employee (1) has a condition that preexists any employment, and (2) develops 
an occupational disease that worsens the condition.12  
The court summarized the point by recognizing four distinct types of “preexisting 
conditions”: (1) A condition developed on the job that preexists the time of the claim.13 (2) A 
condition that preexists the employment that is worsened by a “sudden injury.”14 (3) A condition 
that preexists the employment that is worsened by a “occupational disease.”15 (4) An “occupational 
disease” that is worsened by nonindustrial aggravation.16 The court found that Spangler’s claims 
fell within the third type, governed by NRS 617.366 (1). 
 
The meaning of “condition” and “occupational disease” within the statutes 
 
After determining Spangler’s claim fell under NRS 617.366(1), the court interpreted the 
key terms of the statute, specifically “condition” and “occupational disease.”17 The court notes 
that, within the statute, a meaningful difference exists between the terms, but that the statute fails 
to provide a definition for either. Here, the court wearily prepares to interpret the statute, but avoids 
the endeavor by a convenient fact: the parties agreed that Spangler’s condition would be an 
occupational disease if the condition was sufficiently connected to Spangler’s employment. In 
other words, the parties only disputed the connection. Thus, the court determined that Spangler’s 
claim was eligible for compensation under NRS 617.366(1) as a matter of law.  
 
The appeals officer’s findings of fact and conclusions of law 
 
 
10  Morrow v. Asamera Minerals, 112 Nev. 1347, 929 P.2d 959 (1996). 
11  NEV. REV. STAT. § 617.366 (2017). 
12  Id.  
13  A scenario governed by Morrow, 112 Nev. at 929; Desert Inn Casino & Hotel v. Moran, 106 Nev. 334, 337, 792 
P.2d 400, 402 (1990); and State Indus. Ins. Sys. v. Christensen, 106 Nev. 85, 88, 787 P.2d 408, 409-10 (1990). 
14  A scenario governed by NEV. REV. STAT. § 616A-D. 
15  A scenario governed by NEV. REV. STAT. § 617.366(1). 
16  A scenario governed by NEV. REV. STAT. § 617.366(2). 
17  NEV. REV. STAT. § 617.366(1) (2017). 
Finally, the court assessed the appeals officer’s denial of the claim based on the evidence 
presented. The court referred back to the three medical experts’ opinions. Each expert determined 
that while Spangler’s condition preexisted his employment, the work-sounds made the symptoms 
substantially worse. The court tried to understand why the appeals officer, presented with the same 
evidence, affirmed the denial of the claim. They concluded that the appeals officer mistakenly 
expected Spangler to show that his condition was entirely attributable to his employment. The 
appeals officer also failed to apply NRS 616.366(1), which should have governed. However, 
contrary to the appeals officer’s conclusion, the relevant statutes do not permit denial solely 
because the condition was preexisting. The court found that Spangler should simply have been 
burdened to show that his preexisting hearing loss that was made worse by the work-sounds. Thus, 
the court concluded that the appeals officer incorrectly applied the relevant statutes.  
 
Conclusion 
Because the appeals officer’s factual findings were inconsistent with the correct statutory 
interpretations, the court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. 
Thus, the court affirmed the district court’s decision, but on different grounds, specifically a correct 
application of NRS 617.366(1). The court instructed the district court to remand the matter back 
to the appeals officer. 
